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Leigh McAlister
I study the impact of the used goods market on pricing and profits in the
video game industry and the implications of resale restrictions. I develop a modeling
framework that incorporates (a) heterogeneous consumers who are forward looking
in their buying an selling behaviors, (b) a strategic game producer who prices its
products considering both inter-temporal price discrimination and price competition
with used goods, (c) rational expectations on future prices by both consumers and
the firm, and (d) market equilibria for both new and used-goods markets. With-
out observing sales data, I use equilibrium pricing solutions in my model and the
varying rate of price decrease after a game’s release to identify the sales volume of
a game in every period as a percentage of its total demand. I develop a compu-
tationally tractable utility specification to solve the computational challenge comes
with modeling the supply side equilibrium. I construct the demand function for a
game from heterogeneous consumers whose valuations distribute on an interval, and
partially characterize the consumers’ decisions and reduce the dimensionality of the
state space. Applying the model to a unique dataset of game prices collected from
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the Internet, I estimate the game-specific demand for multiple games released in the
U.S. market. The results show significant variation across games in terms of shapes
of valuation distributions, expected play time, degrees of consumers’ preference for
new over used games, and price sensitivities. Policy simulations show that the effects
of prohibiting resale largely depend on the shape of a game’s demand distribution,
because most of the profits are gained from higher-valuation consumers who purchase
the game when the price is high. Prohibiting resale does not dampen their willing-
ness to pay for the game because their high utility from playing it. Moreover, higher
expected future prices in the absence of the used-game market further reduces their
incentives to wait. I find the predicted profit increase is significant for most games
when reselling is prohibited. However, games with demand consisting mostly of low
valuation consumers benefit less from this structural change, because (a) early sales
increase only slightly given a much smaller proportion of high valuation consumers
and (b) losing the option to resell significantly decreases the willingness to pay for
low valuation consumers, forcing the firm to slash its prices dramatically over time. I
find empirical evidence that a firm can be better off with the used game market. This
suggests that though eliminating the resale market is generally optimal for popular
games, retaining it can be more profitable for some games.
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Chapter 1
Introduction and Literature Review
1.1 Introduction
In June 2013, Microsoft announced that their new video game platform, Xbox
One, would require constant online connection to play and as a result, used game
reselling would be restricted.1 What would be the effect of such a structural change,
and would it be beneficial to producers unconditionally? Although the company
later announced that they had decided to reverse the policy and there would be no
restrictions on reselling,2 this event shows that it is technically feasible to forbid
reselling in the video game industry. This dissertation studies how the used goods
market affects equilibrium outcomes and the implications of prohibiting reselling in
this industry.
Reselling of software poses a serious threat to its producer since the digital
software itself does not physically depreciate; there is little, if any, quality discrep-
ancy between new and used software as long as the media disk can be read. Hence,
it is hard to charge much more for new software than used one. What makes matters
worse for video game producers is that video games can be consumed in relatively
1http://www.ign.com/articles/2013/06/06/microsoft-details-xbox-one-used-games-
always-online
2http://www.ign.com/articles/2013/06/19/microsoft-reversing-xbox-one-internet-
used-game-policies
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short period of time. This differs from office related or utility software which con-
sumers tend to use for extended period of time. Hence, video game producers are
operating in a industry where previously sold copies of a game come back pretty
quickly to the used goods market as competition, and the used games are almost as
good as new. Naturally, some game producers desire to prohibit the reselling of the
used games.3
I investigate these issues by developing a new model of durable goods and
apply it to unique price data collected from the web. In this industry, I observe the
co-existence of new and used goods markets with correlated prices. I also see initially
high but dynamically decreasing game prices, suggesting that consumers’ valuations
for a game is heterogeneous, and firms are using the skimming pricing strategy to
maximize their profits. Realizing this downward trend in prices, a game buyer is
likely to be forward looking, because she can wait to buy a new or used game at
significantly lower price in the future. In addition, she realizes the future opportunity
to recoup part of the price she pays by reselling it after she loses interest in playing the
game anymore. The resale supply will increase with time as more consumers who
have purchased the game earlier lose interest in the game and resell their copies,
making the producer compete heavily against its own products and further slash
its prices. Incorporating these observations, I propose a model which includes the
following components: (a) heterogeneous consumers who are forward looking in their
buying an selling behaviors, (b) a strategic game producer who prices its products
3For example, THQ creative director said “We hope people understand that when the game’s
bought used, we get cheated.” (http://www.computerandvideogames.com/261330/pre-owned-
cheats-developers-thq/)
2
considering both inter-temporal price discrimination and price competition with used
goods, (c) rational expectations on future prices by both consumers and the firm, and
(d) market equilibria for both new and used-goods markets. To my knowledge, my
dissertation is the first to incorporate all these components in a structural empirical
model, which enables me to study a rich collection of counterfactual analyses by
simulating model-based prices and sales.
Modeling the supply side equilibrium brings a significant computational bur-
den due to the well-known Curse of Dimensionality (Bellman, 1957). In this context,
consumers typically adopt a durable good once and exit the market, and thus as the
firm sells its product, the remaining demand dynamically shrinks. Then, as the
researcher tries to accommodate richer heterogeneity, the number of state variables
the firm needs to keep track of increases quickly and it becomes computationally
infeasible to solve the resulting dynamic problem. For example, suppose there are
discrete number of consumer segments, each with a different level of valuation about
the product. Then in each period, the firm needs to keep track of how many con-
sumers are remaining in each segment. In addition, when there is the used goods
market, the firm also needs to take into account how many consumers have pur-
chased the product in previous periods for each segment as well. This is the reason
why previous studies which also estimated dynamic demand in the presence of the
used goods market in this industry (Ishihara and Ching, 2012; Shiller, 2012) used
a couple of segments to model consumer heterogeneity, and also did not model the
supply side equilibrium with the used goods market. Hence, unlike my study, they
cannot generate equilibrium prices under the presence of the used game market.
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In addition, what makes the modeling task especially challenging is that
due to well-developed online marketplaces such as Amazon.com and eBay where
consumers can individually buy and sell used goods, sales volume of used games
is difficult to measure. In addition, an econometrician usually can only observe
price data, whereas the sales information of new products is proprietary. Indeed,
even producers are often not able to obtain the the sales information on the used
products of their own. In solving these issues, my dissertation makes contributions
on the following fronts.
Under market equilibrium, the observed prices provide information about
the underlying demand. Intuitively, slow price decline over time implies significant
demand, whereas fast price decline suggest low demand. With a fully specified
supply-side model, which provides a mapping from demand to prices, we can make
inference on demand without sales data. Our solution is to make use of new and used
goods prices by explicitly solving the new and used-goods market equilibria and then
utilize the equilibrium conditions for estimation. There are several previous studies
(Feenstra and Levinsohn, 1995; Sudhir, 2001; Thomadsen, 2005) which used similar
ideas in static settings. We contribute to this stream of research by extending the
method to dynamic equilibrium models.
Inclusion of the market equilibria for both new and used-goods markets in
the estimation means I have to solve for both consumers’ and the firm’s problem for
each candidate parameter draw, which can make the estimation indefeasibly slow.
I develop a new, computationally tractable utility specification to solve the com-
putational challenge. First, I construct the demand function from heterogeneous
4
consumers with their valuations distributed on a normalized, [0, 1] interval. Then,
I can measure demand for each period with the area under the consumer valuation
distribution density curve, between the valuation of the marginal consumer and the
maximum valuation of the entire unfulfilled demand. Here the marginal consumer is
indifferent between buying a used game at current price and waiting. In this frame-
work, I can characterize the state of the demand parsimoniously with the marginal
consumer’s valuation, because in turn it becomes the maximum valuation of the
unfulfilled demand for the next period. In addition, using equilibrium conditions, I
partially characterize consumers’ dynamic video game buying, keeping and selling
decisions analytically, and summarize the state of the used goods supply with an-
other state variable. This enables me to characterize the state of the market with
only two state variables, which facilitates solving the firm’s dynamic problem. This
approach not only enables me to incorporate the supply side equilibrium in the esti-
mation, but also allow me to accommodate rich, continuous consumer heterogeneity
distribution and non-linear price trajectories for consumer price expectations.
In this framework, the state space cannot be represented by a regular grid,
making many popular approximation methods such as Chevyshev (Judd, 1988) and
cubic spline interpolation (Habermann and Kindermann, 2007) inapplicable. I solve
this challenge by applying the radial basis function approximation methods (Buh-
mann, 2000) which can approximate the surface of a function with scattered data.
To my knowledge, my dissertation is the first one to apply this method to dynamic
programming in the marketing literature.
The estimation of our model is through the Generalized Method of Moments
5
(GMM) (Hansen and Singleton, 1982). From the equilibrium conditions of the dy-
namic model, I solve for the unobserved aggregate demand shocks, from which we
construct moment conditions together with observed prices and instrumental vari-
ables. This procedure is analogous to Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995). I ex-
tend the method to a dynamic equilibrium model with continuous control variables
(prices) instead of a static discrete choice problem, using equilibrium conditions from
both demand and supply sides. Numerical optimization of the GMM objective func-
tion and calculation of the standard errors are challenging due to many local minima
resulting from the highly non-linear nature of the objective function. Hence I employ
the Laplace-type estimator (Chernozhukov and Hong, 2003) for inference, which is
robust to local minima by converting the objective function to the quasi-posterior
distribution and employing MCMC methods to estimate parameters and construct
intervals.
I apply this model to twenty-four video games released in the U.S. market
and estimate the game-specific demand. The results show significant variation across
games in the shape of the valuation distribution, expected play time, degree of
consumers’ preference for a new over a used copy, and demand price sensitivity.
In a counterfactual analysis, I evaluate the profit change for each video game as
a result of eliminating the resale market, assuming that the firms adopt optimal
pricing strategies under the absence of the used game market. The results show that
the effects of prohibiting resale largely depend on the shape of a game’s demand
distribution, because most of the profits are gained from higher-valuation consumers
who purchase the game when the price is high. Since they get high utility from
6
playing a game, prohibiting resale does not dampen their willingness to pay for the
game significantly. However, the absence of the used-game market makes expected
future prices higher, further reduces their incentives to wait. I find the predicted
profit increase is significant for most games, which enjoy a 38% profit increase on
average when reselling is prohibited. However, games with demand consisting mostly
of low valuation consumers benefit less from this structural change, because (a)
early sales increase only slightly given a much smaller proportion of high valuation
consumers and (b) losing the option to resell significantly decreases the willingness
to pay for low valuation consumers, forcing the firm to reduce its prices dramatically
over time. I find empirical evidence that a firm can be better off with the used game
market. This suggests that though eliminating the resale market is generally optimal
for popular games, retaining it can be more profitable for some games.
This dissertation is structured in the following way. In the next section, I
review the current literature on durable goods market, intertemporal price discrim-
ination and the video game industry and elaborate on how my model differs from
the prior work. In Chapter 2, I discuss the construction of a theoretical two-period
model, which illustrates the fundamental ideas of dynamic demand, expectations,
competition between new and used games, intertemporal price discrimination in a
simple setting. I conduct comparative statics to show the effects of the used game
market on equilibrium outcomes. In Chapter 3, I construct a multi-period, empir-
ical model that I take to the data, and characterize the consumers’ and the firm’s
dynamic decisions. Numerical details of solving dynamic problem is discussed. In
Chapter 4, after I describe the data and the estimation strategy, I show the results
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from the estimation and the counterfactual analysis. I conclude my dissertation in
Chapter 5.
1.2 Literature Review
My research builds on the empirical literature in marketing and economics
which develops models on consumers’ dynamic durable goods purchase decisions with
aggregate level data such as Song and Chintagunta (2003), Gordon (2009), Goettler
and Gordon (2011), and Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2012).
In particular, my dissertation is closely related to recent studies which use
dynamic structural models to study video game adoption decisions. Nair (2007) uses
a dynamic discrete choice model of adoption to estimate the demand of a game and
uses equilibrium model in policy simulations to study optimal intertemporal price
discrimination in the U.S. video game industry. Ishihara and Ching (2012) devel-
ops dynamic choice model with the used goods market, utilizing recently developed
Bayesian estimation of dynamic structural model (Imai, Jain, and Ching, 2009) and
studies the effect of the used goods market on new goods sales. They collected and
used data from Japanese video game industry where they observe information about
the intermediaries who buy and sell the used games. Shiller (2012) added used goods
market to Nair (2007)’s approach and estimated dynamic demand with used goods
and evaluated profit changes after elimination of the used goods market. He used
data on used game auctions from one of the popular online marketplace and scaled
up this partial information to the entire U.S. market.
I contribute to this stream of research by developing a new dynamic general
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equilibrium model of video game adoption and resale. Importantly, I fully specify
the supply side equilibria incorporating both new and used goods markets, unlike
previous studies which did not model the supply side. Hence, I can generate equilib-
rium prices under the presence of the used goods market, whereas previous studies
cannot. In my model the equilibrium price trajectory can be directly solved from
the model under different market structures, facilitating counterfactual analyses.
Also, by assuming that the observed new prices are optimally set by the
firm and the used goods market is competitive, I infer sales volume in each period
from the observed prices using equilibrium conditions. This enables me to make
inference on demand without observing the sales data. The idea of using equilibrium
conditions from the model to make inference with limited data has been employed in
the literature. For example, Feenstra and Levinsohn (1995) and Thomadsen (2005)
estimated their models without observing sales in static settings. Also, Sudhir (2001)
used game-theoretic solutions to infer wholesale prices in the absence of information
on those prices. I contribute to this stream of research by extending the method to
dynamic equilibrium models.
In solving for the supply side equilibrium, I find many approximation meth-
ods which are popular in marketing and economics such as Chebyshev (Judd, 1988)
and cubic spline (Habermann and Kindermann, 2007) interpolation inadequate for
my application. This is due to the fact that the feasible state space of my model
cannot be represented by a tensor product of state variables. Hence, I use the radial
basis function approximation methods (Buhmann, 2000) which can approximate the
surface of a function with scattered data. To my knowledge, my dissertation is the
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first one to apply this method to dynamic programming in the marketing literature.
My dissertation is also related to recent studies which estimated the video
game console demand along with the software demand such as Derdenger (2014);
Derdenger and Kumar (2013); Lee (2013). The scope of my dissertation is quite
different from that of these studies; while my study does not include the console
demand or the competition among video games, it focuses on the intertemporal
price discrimination and the used goods market.
Theoretically, since the Coase conjecture (Coase, 1972), which makes an
argument that a monopolist who sells a durable good to patient and heterogeneous
consumers in an infinite time horizon can forfeit all his monopoly power,4 there
has been rich stream of literature on durable good monopolist’s intertemporal price
discrimination problem (Bulow, 1982; Huang, Yang, and Anderson, 2001; Karp, 1996;
Stokey, 1979, 1981). In my model, while the monopolist does keep certain level of
monopoly power because there is significant the time interval between successive
price revisions, it does lose some monopoly power due to forward-looking behavior
of consumers. Besanko and Winston (1990) is directly related to my study, as the
authors study a stylized model of the intertemporal pricing problem for a monopolist
selling a new product with forward-looking consumers, where consumers decide when
to adopt the product. I extend this model to allow consumers to buy and sell used
goods. Instead of discrete choice framework, my empirical model closely follows the
theoretical model. This allows me to use continuous heterogeneity distribution on
4As the length of time interval between price revisions goes to 0 (consumers’ discount rate over
the time interval goes to 1), the monopolist lowers its price and eventually sets the competitive
price, saturates the market in the initial period.
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consumer valuation instead of the segment approach typically used in the literature.
Also, the intertemporal pricing problem is related to the infinite-horizon bargaining
models with one-sided incomplete information (Roth, 1985).
Finally, there is a large theoretical literature on the interaction between new
and used durable goods markets. These include optimal durability (Rust, 1986;
Swan, 1970), leasing contracts (e.g., Desai and Purohit, 1999), channel coordination
(Desai, Koenigsberg, and Purohit, 2004; Shulman and Coughlan, 2007), role of trade-
ins (Rao, Narasimhan, and John, 2009), and peer-to-peer used goods (Yin, Ray,
Gurnani, and Animesh, 2010) market. Also, there have been literature about optimal
durability (Hendel and Lizzeri, 1999b; Swan, 1970), and adverse selection (Akerlof,
1970; Hendel and Lizzeri, 1999a).
11
Chapter 2
Two-Period Model
In this chapter, I introduce a two-period model, which illustrates the funda-
mental ideas of dynamic demand, expectations, competition between new and used
games, an intertemporal price discrimination. This model can be solved analytically,
which enables me to conduct comparative statics and show the effects of the used
game market on equilibrium outcomes.
2.1 Two-Period Model
I consider a dynamic game played between a monopolistic firm selling a
durable good and forward-looking consumers with heterogeneous valuations in the
presence of the used goods market. The firm sells the durable good to a unit mass
of consumers, whose flow valuations (denoted by v) follow a distribution with c.d.f
F (v), whose support is the unit interval [0, 1]. The consumers share a discount factor
δ, and I assume that they buy only one copy of the game. The initial t = 1 represents
the period when the game is released, so there is no used goods supply and the used
goods market starts at period 2. The utility a consumer gets from the period when
she purchases the game depends on whether she purchases new or used copy. A
consumer with valuation v gets utility αv, α > 1, from buying a new copy, whereas
she gets v if she purchases a used copy. The parameter α represents consumers’ taste
12
for newness; for example, the additional utility they get from opening the package
of a new copy of the game. In the following periods after purchase, however, both
new and used copies give her the same flow utility v from playing the game. This
reflects the idea that the utility consumers get from playing a video game does not
depreciate physically. Since a video game essentially consists of digitally stored data,
once a consumer starts playing a game, she must get the identical experience from
the used and new copy as long as the game runs.
In each period after purchase period, I assume that a consumer who owns
the game probabilistically loses interest in the game, and after that the utility from
owning the game becomes zero. This can be interpreted as her completing all the
scenarios in the game or just finding it not interesting anymore. Hence I am taking a
discrete approach on the depreciation of consumers’ utility from game holding. Note
that my definition of the event of losing interest in the game is general in a sense that
it includes a broad range of consumers’ unobservable post-purchase behavior. The
existence of the used goods market allows consumers who previously purchased the
game, either new or used, to sell their used games in any period. They act as price
takers, and optimally decide whether or not to sell the game at market-prevailing
price.
Consumers are forward looking in both their purchase and selling decisions;
consumers take into account the possibility of lower future prices for both new and
used games. Moreover, they consider the potential opportunity to sell the product
after losing interest in the game and expect future used game prices for the selling
option. I assume that both the firm and consumers form rational expectations; their
13
expectations about future prices are consistent with the model.
In sum, in each period, upon observing the states including prices of a new
copy pt and a used copy put, consumers who have yet purchased the game decide
whether to purchase new copy, purchase used copy, or wait based on current prices
and their expectations of future prices. Consumers who already own the game decide
whether or not to sell their game in the used market at market price put. If they
decide to keep the game, they get the flow utility if they have not lost interest in the
game, and get zero if they have. The firm takes the consumers’ behaviors as well as
the interaction between its decision and the response from the used goods market
into account in formulating its intertemporal pricing policy. In this model, both new
and used good prices are equilibrium outcomes of a game played between the firm
and its consumers.
In the two-period model, I let v be the total utility from a game instead of
flow utility since I only have two periods for simplicity. If a consumer purchases the
game in period 1, she loses interest in it within that period with probability λ. Then
she sells her video game in the used goods market in period 2.
2.2 Solution of the equilibrium
I solve for the equilibrium by backward induction, starting in period 2. Let
v1 be the valuation of the marginal consumer who is indifferent between purchasing
a new game of the game in period 1 and purchasing either a new or used game in
period 2. Since there are no used game transactions in period 1 and to be consistent
with the notations in the empirical model, I let v2 = v1 and use v2 as the state in
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period 2. Let p∗u2 be the used goods market clearing price, and let v¯2 denote the
valuation of the consumer who is indifferent between buying the new and used game
in period 2. Then given period 2 new good price, p2,
αv¯2 − p2 = v¯2 − p∗u2 ⇒ v¯2 =
p2 − p∗u2
α− 1 (2.2.1)
Let v3 represent the valuation of the consumer who is indifferent between
buying a used game and not buying anything in period 2 and then,
v3 = p
∗
u2 (2.2.2)
Since consumers who lost interest in the game get zero utility from owning it,
they will sell their games at any pu2 > 0. On aggregate, the supply of the used game
in period 2 is λs1, where s1 = 1− v2, the period 1 sales. In turn, p∗u2 is determined
at where the used goods sales (v¯2 − v3) equals to the used goods supply:
v¯2 − v3 =
p2 − pu2
α− 1 − pu2 = λs1 = λ · (1− v2) (2.2.3)
∴ p∗u2 =
αλv2 − αλ− λv2 + λ+ p2
α
(2.2.4)
The firm sets p2 to maximize the second period profit, taking into account
the effect of its decision on p∗u2. Note that the market size in period 2 is v2. Then,
the firm’s period 2 sales are,
v2 − v¯2 = v2 −
p2 − p∗u2
α− 1 =
1
α
((α+ λ) v2 − λ− p2) (2.2.5)
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and the profit in period 2 is Π2 =
1
α
((α+ λ) v2 − p2 − λ) · p2. From the following
first-order conditions,
∂Π2
∂p2
: (α+ λ) v2 − 2p2 − λ = 0, (2.2.6)
I derive the equilibrium prices and profit in period 2,
∴ p∗2 =
1
2
((α+ λ)v2 − λ) ,
p∗u2 =
1
2α
{αv2 − λ(2α− 1)(1− v2)} , (2.2.7)
Π∗2 =
1
4α
((α+ λ)v2 − λ)2 .
Now consider period 1. The indifference condition for the valuation of the
marginal consumer v2 is,
αv2 − p1 + δ ((1− λ)v2 + λEpu2) = δ(max{αv2 − Ep2, v2 − Epu2}) ≥ 0 (2.2.8)
Assuming rational expectations, I have Ep2 = p2 and Epu2 = pu2. From the
results of period 2, the value of v which satisfies αv−p2 = v−pu2 is v¯2, which is clearly
less than v2, because v2 is the upper bound of the valuations of consumers who have
not purchased the game in period 1. Hence, I have max{αv2−p2, v2−pu2} = αv2−p2
, and from Equation (2.2.8) I have,
v2 =
(2α− 1) δλ2 + αδλ+ 2αp1
(2α− 1) δλ2 − α2δ + 2αδλ+ 2α2 (2.2.9)
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The total sum of the discounted profit is,
Π = Π1 + δΠ2 = (1− v2(p1)) · p1 + δ ·
1
4α
((α+ λ)v2 − λ)2 (2.2.10)
To solve this, let
∆1 = α
3δ2 − 4α3δ + 4α3 + 3α2δ2λ− 4α2δ2 + 4α2δλ2 − 4α2δλ+ 6α2δp1
∆2 = 8α
2δ − 8α2p1 + 7αδ2λ2 − 4αδ2λ+ 4αδ2 − 8αδλ2p1
∆3 = −4αδλ2 + 4αδλp1 − 8αδp1 + δ2λ3 − 4δ2λ2 + 6δλ2p1
then I can denote the first order condition as
∂Π
∂p1
=
α (∆1 + ∆2 + ∆3)
(α2δ − 2α2 − 2αδλ2 − 2αδ + δλ2)2 = 0
Also, the second-order condition is satisfied,
∂2Π
∂p21
=
2α
(
3α2δ − 4α2 + 2αδλ− 4αδ + 3δλ2 − 4αδλ2)
(α2δ − 2α2 − 2αδλ2 − 2αδ + δλ2)2 < 0,
because 3α2δ − 4α2 < 0, 2αδλ − 4αδ < 0 and 3δλ2 − 4αδλ2 < 0 given α > 1,
0 < δ < 1, and 0 < λ < 1.
By solving the FOC, I have the following equilibrium values,
p∗1 = −
α3δ2 − 4α3δ + 4α3 + 3α2δ2λ− 4α2δ2 + 4α2δλ2 − 4α2δλ
6α2δ − 8α2 − 8αδλ2 + 4αδλ− 8αδ + 6δλ2
−8α
2δ + 7αδ2λ2 − 4αδ2λ+ 4αδ2 − 4αδλ2 + δ2λ3 − 4δ2λ2
6α2δ − 8α2 − 8αδλ2 + 4αδλ− 8αδ + 6δλ2
v∗2 =
α2δ − 2α2 − 4αδλ2 − 2αδ + 3δλ2
3α2δ − 4α2 − 4αδλ2 + 2αδλ− 4αδ + 3δλ2 (2.2.11)
Π∗ = −α
(
α2δ2 − 4α2δ + 4α2 + 4αδ2λ2 + 6αδ2λ− 4αδ2 − 8αδλ+ 8αδ + δ2λ2 − 8δ2λ+ 4δ2)
12α2δ − 16α2 − 16αδλ2 + 8αδλ− 16αδ + 12δλ2
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To illustrate the effect of the used goods market on equilibrium values, I also
solve for the equilibrium without the used goods market. In this case, the period 2
decision becomes (v1 and v2 no longer exist and consumers’ decisions are summarized
by v1 and v2 instead),
αv¯2 − p2 = 0. (2.2.12)
The decision to buy in period 1 is characterized by
αv¯1 − p1 + δ(1− λ)v1 = δ(αv1 − Ep2) ≥ 0
Without the used goods market, the decision to buy in period 2 becomes
αv¯2 − p2 = 0⇒ v1 = p2
α
(2.2.13)
and period 2 profit is:
Π2 = p2
(
v¯1 − p2
α
)
(2.2.14)
first order conditions yields
α
(
v¯1 − 2p2
α
)
= 0 (2.2.15)
Hence, equilibrium period 2 values are
p∗2 =
1
2
αv¯1, Π
∗
1 =
1
4
αv¯21 (2.2.16)
period 1 decision is characterized by
αv¯1 − p1 + δ(1− λ)v1 = δ(αv1 − Ep2) ≥ 0 (2.2.17)
by plugging in period 2 equilibrium values, I have
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v¯1 = − 2p1
αδ − 2α+ 2δλ− 2δ (2.2.18)
The total sum of discounted profit is
Π = Π1 + Π2δ =
1
4
αv¯21δ + p1 (−v¯1 + 1) (2.2.19)
First order conditions:
∂Π
∂p1
=
2αδp1 + 4p1 (αδ − 2α+ 2δλ− 2δ) + (αδ − 2α+ 2δλ− 2δ)2
(αδ − 2α+ 2δλ− 2δ)2 = 0 (2.2.20)
the second-order condition is satisfied,
∂2Π
∂p21
=
6αδ − 8α+ 8δλ− 8δ
(αδ − 2α+ 2δλ− 2δ)2 < 0,
again because 6αδ−8α < 0 and 8δλ−8δ < 0 given α > 1, 0 < δ < 1, and 0 < λ < 1.
Hence, I have the following equilibrium values:
p∗1 = −
(αδ − 2α+ 2δλ− 2δ)2
6αδ − 8α+ 8δλ− 8δ
v¯∗1 =
αδ − 2α+ 2δλ− 2δ
3αδ − 4α+ 4δλ− 4δ (2.2.21)
Π∗ = − (αδ − 2α+ 2δλ− 2δ)
2
12αδ − 16α+ 16δλ− 16δ
2.3 Comparative Statics
I conduct comparative statics to show the effect of the used goods market
on equilibrium outcomes, and visualize them with a series of plots. I am mainly
interested in how the equilibrium outcomes depend on the level competition from
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the used goods market, which is represented by λ. However, increase in λ decreases
the durability of the game, and it has the following two effects. First, it will lower
consumers’ expected utility from purchasing the game earlier and hence decrease
their willingness to pay in period 1. Second, given the same period 1 sales, it will
increase the supply of used goods in period 2 because more consumers will lose
interest in the game after one period. To highlight only the effect of increase in λ
on equilibrium values through increasing used goods supply, I compare between the
results from the model with and without the used goods market. I depict the results
of the two models with parameter values α = 1.1, δ = 0.9 side-by-side in Figure 2.1.
First I discuss the changes caused by the decrease in the expected utilities
with larger λ. As I described above, the increase in λ makes purchasing the game
in period 1 less attractive to consumers, decreasing their willingness to pay. This
explains the changes shown in the model without the used goods market. With
consumers’ lower willingness to pay for the game, the firm charges lower price for
the game in period 1, but the firm does not reduce the price too much since it can
recoup some of the lost sales in period 2. Thus the period 1 sales decline. However,
since the expected utility of period 2 remains the same, period 2 sales increase due
to the higher remaining demand. Overall, the total profit suffers.
With the introduction of the used goods market, I see the firm reacts differ-
ently to changes in λ. As λ increases, period 1 sales becomes less attractive for the
firm, because the sold goods will come back in period 2 as the used goods supply.
Thus, with the existence of the used goods market, as opposed to the absence of it,
the firm responds by maintaining relatively higher price in period 1 and sells even
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Figure 2.1: Comparative Statics
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less. To be more precise, in the lower range of λ, the firm still decreases the price
a little bit because the effects from the reduced expected utility dominate the com-
petitive force from the used goods market. Still, the size of price decrease in this
case is smaller than that in the case of the no used goods counterpart. As a part of
the sales in period 1 becomes used goods supply in the next period, period 2 sales
actually decrease somewhat. With higher λ, however, the competitive force from the
used goods market dominates, and the firm actually increases period 1 price, further
reducing period 1 sales.
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Chapter 3
Multi-period Model for Empirical Analysis
In this chapter I introduce a multi-period model with an aggregate demand
shock and additional parameters to fit the video game data and quantify the effects
of used goods market on equilibrium outcomes and run policy simulations. The
structure of the multi-period model is natural extension of the two-period model:
I assume (i) consumers are forward-looking in their game purchasing and selling
decisions, (ii) game producers apply Markov pricing strategies, and (iii) the new and
used goods market outcomes follow a Markov Perfect equilibrium.
3.1 Model for Consumers
3.1.1 Demand Model
Per-period utility Let v denote a consumer’s single-period consumption value of
owning the game at period t, where I let F (v) denote the c.d.f of this valuation
distribution on the support of [0, 1]. If the consumer has not purchased the game
yet, her single-period utility for purchasing decisions in period t for is given by ujt:
ujt =

ξtαv − βpt if purchasing a new copy (j = 1)
ξtv − βput if purchasing a used copy (j = 2)
0 if no purchase (j = 0),
(3.1.1)
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where α and β denote consumers’ taste for a new copy and price sensitivity, respec-
tively. ξt represents the aggregate demand shock. I assume that ξt’s are i.i.d draws
from a distribution on (0,∞) with a mean equal to 1. I do not allow ξt to be below
zero, which would yield a situation where the consumer would not buy the product
at a negative price, which is unreasonable for a video game because possessing it
does not generate negative utility and disposing it is practically costless.
Consistent with previous literature which studied video game industry (Ishi-
hara and Ching, 2012; Lee, 2013; Nair, 2007; Shiller, 2012), I do not model the
competition among different video games. As Nair (2007) argued, the large number
of fairly differentiated games makes the games weak substitutes for each other, and
the observed declining price trajectories cannot be explained by inter-game competi-
tion. Also, modeling competition would make the dimensionality of the state space
computationally intractable.
Next, consider the consumers’ selling decisions. Suppose a consumer has
bought the game prior to period t, and has not lost interest in the game yet. Then,
she can choose to resell the game at used market price put, or keep the game and
receive the flow utility:
wkt =
βput if selling the game (k = 1)ξtv if keeping the game (k = 0). (3.1.2)
Notice that I assume that the aggregate demand shock, ξt, also enters to the utility
of consumers who already purchased the game. This assumption is reasonable when
the source of the aggregate error is the shocks on game-playing values. For example,
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if potential buyers get a positive shock because it is a holiday and they have more
spare time to play the game, then consumers who already have the game are likely to
get more utility from the game as well. However, if the shock is from an increase in
the firm’s marketing expenditure (e.g., game advertisement), then it is more likely
to affect potential buyers. It can still affect the utility of current game holders,
however, by increasing the number of people they can interact with about the game.
Once the consumer loses interest in the game, he gets zero utility from game
holding1:
zlt =
βput if selling the game (l = 1)0 if keeping the game (l = 0), (3.1.3)
Probability of losing interest in the game For the empirical model I assume
the hazard of losing interest in the game, λ, to be constant. I can extend the model
by allowing the hazard that the consumer loses interest in the game after holding it
for τ periods to be a function of time, λ (τ). Then λ(τ) would a discrete time hazard
function, which is similar to what Farias, Saure, and Weintraub (2012) assumed in
their example model.2
States I drop the time subscript and denote current period variables without any
superscript and the next period variables with superscript ′. Let x ∈ X, where
X is the feasible set of x, denote the current period state variables common to the
1I do not include the transaction cost in the model explicitly. Transaction cost is more of
a nuisance parameter, as it is not a particular interest of this study. I opt to not include the
parameter in my model, and instead estimating it separately and subtract the estimate from the
prices before the estimation of the structural parameters.
2They assumed that a firm’s individual state depreciates by one state with probability δ.
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consumers and the firm which hold relevant aggregate level information. Specifically,
I need to know the information about 1) potential used copy supply and 2) remaining
demand in this period, and these potentially include the entire history of new and
used copy transactions. By firstly characterizing consumers’ decisions, however, I
summarize this information with a couple of variables, s and v. s denotes the sum
of total new copy sales so far and it represents the source of the used copy supply,
while v denotes the lowest valuation of the consumer who purchased the game in
the previous period, and it summarizes the remaining demand. I can characterize
the consumers’ problem separately from that of the firm because there are many
game buyers and sellers and they act as price takers in their decisions. Hence for the
consumers, their state variables include the current prices, p = (p, pu) in addition to
x.
Bellman Equations First consider the value function of a consumer with valua-
tion v who has purchased the game τ periods ago. It differs by whether or not the
consumer has lost interest in the game. At any period, let W (v,p,x) denote the
value function where she has not lost interest in the game, and Z(p,x) denote the
value function where she has. Consider the Bellman equation Z(p,x) first:
Z(p,x) = max{Z0(p,x), Z1(p,x)} (3.1.4)
where Zl(·), l ∈ {0, 1} are her alternative-specific value functions given by
Zl(p,x) =
βpu selling (l = 1),δE [Z(p′,x′)|x] keeping (l = 0) (3.1.5)
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Hence once she loses interest in playing the game, she does not get any utility from
it anymore. Also,x has sufficient information about future expected prices so the
expectation is only conditional onx. Meanwhile, if she has not lost interest in the
game, the Bellman equation is given by:
W (v,p,x) = max{W0(v,p,x),W1(v,p,x)} (3.1.6)
where Wk(·), k ∈ {0, 1} are her alternative-specific value functions given by
Wk(v,p,x) =
βpu selling (k = 1),ξv + δ {(1− λ)E [W (v,p′,x′)|x] + λE [Z(p′,x′)|x]} keeping (k = 0).
(3.1.7)
Note that with constant λ, W (·) does not depend on the number of holding periods
τ .
Next, consider the purchasing decision of a potential consumer who has not
purchased the game yet. Let V (v,p,x) the value function for her. Then V (v,p,x)
satisfies the following Bellman equation:
V (v,p,x) = max{V0(v,p,x), V1(v,p,x), V2(v,p,x)} (3.1.8)
where Vj(·), j ∈ {0, 1, 2} are her alternative-specific value functions given by
Vj(v,p,x) =

ξαv − βp+ δ {(1− λ)E [W (v,p′,x′)|x] + λE [Z(p′,x′)|x]} (j = 1),
ξv − βpu + δ {(1− λ)E [W (v,p′,x′)|x] + λE [Z(p′,x′)|x]} (j = 2),
δE [V (v,p′,x′)|x] (j = 0).
(3.1.9)
where j denotes buying new copy (j = 1), buying used copy (j = 2), and waiting
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(j = 0), respectively.
Consumers’ buying decisions Given the states, Consumers make decisions on
new and used copy buying and used copy selling independently from the firm. I
characterize consumers’ decision with new copy and used copy marginal consumer;
let v¯ and v′ denote the valuation of these two consumers, respectively. For any new
and used prices, the new copy marginal consumer in current period is indifferent
between purchasing new or used. Thus given p and pu, v¯ is given by the solution to
the following:
ξαv¯ − βp+ δ {(1− λ)E [W (v¯,p′,x′)|x]+ λE [Z(p′,x′)|x]}︸ ︷︷ ︸
buy new copy
= (3.1.10)
ξv¯ − βpu + δ
{
(1− λ)E [W (v¯,p′,x′)|x]+ λE [Z(p′,x′)|x]}︸ ︷︷ ︸
buy used copy
. (3.1.11)
The used copy marginal consumer in current period is indifferent between
buying used copy now and waiting til the next period and making a decision. Hence
current period used copy marginal consumer v′ is given by the solution to the fol-
lowing:
ξv′ − βpu + δ
{
(1− λ)E [W (v′,p′,x′)|x]+ λE [Z(p′,x′)|x]}︸ ︷︷ ︸
buy used copy
= δE
[
V (v′,p′,x′)|x]︸ ︷︷ ︸
wait
.
(3.1.12)
Firstly, it is straightforward to prove that for any sequence of future expected prices,
if a consumer with valuation v˜ purchases either new or used copy in a given period,
a consumer with a valuation v > v˜ who has not yet purchased the game will also
purchase in the same period. In addition, the assumption that consumers get lower
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initial utility from buying a used copy than from buying a new copy implies that the
new copy price p is greater than pu in an equilibrium, since otherwise everyone will
buy new copy and the demand for the used will be zero. If the new copy price is
higher than used copy price, the reservation valuation of a consumer who purchased
an new copy also must be greater than v . Hence v denotes the lowest valuation of
consumer who have purchased either new or used copy by the previous period, and
it determines remaining demand in current period. The set of consumers who have
purchased by the end of the last period will be on the interval [v, 1]. In addition,
the used copy demand in the current period is v¯ − v′.
From equation (3.1.10), v satisfies:
v¯ =
β (p− pu)
ξ(α− 1) (3.1.13)
Hence, once a consumer decides to buy the game, choosing between used and
new good does not have dynamic aspect, as it only depends on the relative prices
between new and used game. Now consider the used copy marginal consumer. Firstly
I claim that the right hand side of (3.1.12), δE [V (v′,x′)|x] equals to δE [V1(v′,x′)|x].
This is because in the next period, v′ is the upper bound of the valuation of consumers
who have not purchased the game yet. Hence it has to be bigger than v¯′, which is
the valuation of indifferent consumer between purchasing the new and the used copy
in the next period. Hence, V1(v′,p′,x′) > V2(v′,p′,x′) and I have
ξv′ − βpu + δ
{
(1− λ)E [W (v′,p′,x′)|x]+ λE [Z(p,x′)|x]} = δE [V1(v′,p′,x′)|x]
(3.1.14)
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3.1.2 Selling Decisions
By exploiting equilibrium conditions, I can study how consumers behave in
an equilibrium regarding their used game selling decisions independently from the
firm’s problem. I found a couple of propositions which characterize their optimal
decisions, and they significantly simplify their optimal used good selling behavior
before I describe the firms’ problem.
Proposition 1. In equilibrium, consumers would sell the game immediately once
they lose interest in the game.
Proof. At any period, all consumers who already own the game have valuation v ≥ v.
Hence, for any of them to sell their used copies of the game, pu at least needs to
satisfy the following:
βpu ≥ ξv + δ
{
(1− λ)E [W (v,p′,x′)|x]+ λE [Z(p′,x′)|x]} (3.1.15)
I show that at βpu = ξv+δ {(1− λ)E [W (v,p′,x′)|x] + λE [Z(p′,x′)|x]}, no
one with v < v will buy the used copy. That is, for all consumers with v ≤ v, their
discounted future expected utility from purchasing the used copy at pu is smaller
than that from purchasing in the next period at E [p′u|xt]. This is because the
difference between pu and Ep′u is more than enough to compensate the loss of one
period flow utility. If there is no demand at this price, then there is no demand at
higher prices either, and thus they cannot be supported in an equilibrium.
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The expected payoff from purchasing a used copy is
ξv − βpu + δ
{
(1− λ)E [W (v,p′,x′)|x]+ λE [Z(p′,x′)|x]}
By substituting βpu with ξv + δ {(1− λ)E [W (v,p′,x′)|x] + λE [Z(p′,x′)|x]},
ξv − ξv + δ {(1− λ)E [W (v,p′,x′)|x]}− δ {(1− λ)E [W (v,p′,x′)|x]} < 0
since v ≤ v and E [W (v,p′,x′)|x] ≤ E [W (v,p′,x′)|x]. Hence, no consumer whose
valuation is v ≤ v will buy a used copy at this price, and thus it cannot be an
equilibrium, and W (v,p,x) = ξv + δ {(1− λ)E [W (v,p′,x′)|x] + λE [Z(p′,x′)|x]}.
Proposition 1 also implies the following corollary.
Corollary 1. In equilibrium, current used copy price, pu, is greater than future
discounted expected used copy price δEp′u. That is, I have pu > δEp′u for all period.
Proposition 2. If λ(τ) is nondecreasing in τ , among consumers who own the game,
those who have not lost interest in the game do not sell their copies at the market
prevailing used good price in equilibrium.
Proof. For consumers to wait instead of selling after losing interest, there must be
an period where they want to wait and sell in the next period. Hence, it is sufficient
to show that for any adjacent period, consumers who lost interest in the game do not
have the incentive to wait and sell in the next period. In any period, for a consumer
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to expect to do so, the current used price needs to be
βpu ≤ δβE
[
p′u|x
]
For this price to be an outcome of an equilibrium, there needs to be zero demand
at this price, because otherwise there are consumers who are willing to pay more
than βpu = δβE [p′u|x] for the used copy in this period, and at that price, suppliers
are also willing to sell their copies instead of waiting. Let’s compare the utility of
buying now and buying in the next period for a consumer who has valuation v when
the price is βpu = δβE [p′u|x]:
v − βpu + δ
{
(1− λ)E [W (v,p′,x′)|x]+ λE [Z(p′,x′)|x]}
−δ [v − Eβp′u + δ {(1− λ)E [W (v,p′′,x′′)|x]+ λE [Z(p′′,x′′)|x]}]
⇒ v − δβEp′u + δ
{
(1− λ)E [W (v,p′,x′)|x]+ λE [Z(p′,x′)|x]}
−δ [v − Eβp′u + δ {(1− λ)E [W (v,p′′,x′′)|x]+ λE [Z(p′′,x′′)|x]}]
⇒ (1− δ)v + δ {(1− λ)E [W (v,p′,x′)|x]+ λE [Z(p′,x′)|x]}
−δ2 {(1− λ)E [W (v,p′′,x′′)|x]+ λE [Z(p′′,x′′)|x]} ≥ 0
which holds because E [W (v,p′,x′)|x] ≥ E [W (v,p′′,x′′)|x] and E [Z(p′,x′)|x] ≥
E [Z(p′′,x′′)|x]. Hence, at this price, consumers are better off buying now than
waiting, and thus it cannot be an outcome of an equilibrium. Thus consumers do
not have an incentive to wait once they lose interest in playing the game, and I have
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Z(p,x) = pu in equilibrium.
Propositions 1 and 2 simplify the consumers’ used goods selling decisions
significantly. Even though I allow consumers to optimally sell their copies, the
solution of their post-purchase dynamic problem becomes trivial; in an equilibrium
they will not sell their copies until they lose interest the game, and they will do so
immediately on losing interest, regardless of the used copy price. Hence the supply
of used copy in period t is exactly the same as the number of consumers who own
the game prior to period t and just have lost interest in the game. Then, with the
assumption that probability of losing interest in the game is constant λ, I have the
following used copy supply:
q∗ut = λ ·
(
t−1∑
τ=0
qτ
)
= λ · s
that is, it becomes just λ times s, the cumulative new copy sales up to the previ-
ous period. This is because since the probability of losing interest is constant, all
consumers who own the game has the same chance of losing interest in the game,
regardless of their valuation of the game and how long they had been playing the
game. Also, previous used good transactions become irrelevant because they do not
affect how many people have the game, as only the ownership of the copy changes
with used copy transactions. Hence, instead of keeping track of how many games
are sold in each previous period, I only need to know how many games are sold so
far.
In sum, as described above, the state x consists of (s, v), where s denotes the
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cumulative sales up to the previous period and v is the lowest valuation of consumer
who have purchased either new copy or used copy by the previous period defined
in (3.1.12). The feasible set for the state variables is X = {(v, s)|1 ≥ v, s ≥ 0, v ≤
F−1(1 − s)}. 1 − s is the remaining demand only when all of the cumulative sales,
s, occurred in the last period and there has been no used goods transaction. Thus,
F−1(1− s) is the upper bound of v.
3.1.3 Consumer Expectations
Specifying how consumers form expectations about future prices is an impor-
tant component of a dynamic model. Usual treatment of the price expectations in the
literature is that assuming consumers are bounded rational in a sense that they form
their price expectations based on current prices and use reduced form regressions to
recover the expectation parameters Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2012); Ishihara and
Ching (2012); Lee (2013); Nair (2007); Shiller (2012). One of the reasons of this is
that consumers’ problem becomes complicated when one assumes that consumers
know the states and the policy rule the firm uses and form the expectations accord-
ingly. In my model, however, I assume consumers form rational expectations about
future prices and thus they share the same aggregate state variables with the firm
in the estimation. This is possible because of the following two reasons: firstly, due
to propositions 1 and 2, I simplified the consumers’ dynamic problem significantly,
and I am able to embed the solution of their dynamic problem in the equilibrium
used copy price condition. Also, my estimation strategy depends on solving the dy-
namic programming problem for the firm during parameter search. Hence, assuming
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rational expectations does not impose any additional computational burden.
3.2 Model for a Game Producer
Now I am ready to describe the firm’s problem. Since the firm also has
rational expectations about future prices and also it incorporates the response from
consumers and the used goods market, consumers’ behavior must be defined before
I characterize the firm’s behavior.
For implementation I use v¯ instead of p for the firm’s control, since choosing
the quantity and the price is equivalent in the monopolist’s problem. The new good
sales are q∗(v,x) = F (v)−F (v), the equilibrium used goods supply is qs∗u (x) = λ · s,
and used goods demand is qd∗u (v, v′,x) = F (v)−F (v′) and I have the following state
transition rules:
s∗(q,x) = s+ q (3.2.1)
v∗(v,x) = qd∗−1u (v, q
s∗
u (x),x) (3.2.2)
where qd∗−1u is the inverse function of qd∗u (·) with respect to v.
As described above, the aggregate used game supply is λ · s regardless of
the used game price. Then, the used game price will be adjusted so the used copy
demand is equal to the supply. From the market clearing condition, I have the
following used game price equation,
p∗u(v, v
′,x) = β−1
{(
(ξ − 1) + 1− δ
1− δ(1− λ) − δ(α− 1)
)
v′ (3.2.3)
−δλE [W2(x′)∣∣x]}+ δE [p(x′)∣∣x]+ δλE [pu(x′)∣∣x] .
35
for the derivation of (3.2.3), see the Appendix 1. Then, new copy price is determined
from 3.1.13,
p∗(v, pu,x) = β−1ξ(α− 1) · v + pu. (3.2.4)
Hence, when the firm maximizes its profit, it incorporates the consumers’
future price expectations and their optimal behavior through the used game price.
Since both the firm and consumers form rational expectations, their price expecta-
tions are consistent.
The firm solves the following problem to maximize the expected sum dis-
counted future profit,
Π(x) = max
v
{
p · q + δf · E
[
Π(x′)
∣∣x]} . (3.2.5)
subject to: q = q∗(v,x)
s′ = s∗(q,x)
qsu = q
s∗
u (x)
v′ = qd∗−1u (v, q
s
u,x)
pu = p
∗
u(v, v
′,x)
p = p∗(v, pu,x)
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3.3 Market Equilibrium
To define the equilibrium, I introduce the following notations. Let v∗(x)
denote the monopolist’s equilibrium quantity strategy and v′∗(x) denote the valu-
ation of the consumer who is indifferent between buying a used game in current
period and buying a new game in the next period when faced with state x. Since
v∗(x), v′∗(x) themselves are functions of the state variables, with slight abuse of
notation, I also denote, qd∗u (x) = qd∗u (v∗(x), v′∗(x),x), p∗u(x) = p∗u(v(x), v′∗(x),x),
and p∗(x) = p∗(v∗(x), p∗u(x),x).
Definition. AMarkov-perfect equilibrium in this model is defined by following policy
rules as functions: valuations v∗(·) and v′∗(·), prices p∗(·) and p∗u(·), quantities q∗(·),
qs∗u (·) and qd∗u (·) such that
1. For any period and for any x ∈ X, v∗(x) solves the firm’s optimization problem
defined in (3.2.5),
2. For any period and for any x ∈ X, and p, pu ≥ 0, a consumer with valuation
v make a purchase of a new game in current period if and only if his current
period utility from doing so exceeds his utility from purchasing a new game in
any future periods, purchasing a used game in current and all future periods,
or not purchasing at all,
3. for any period and for any x ∈ X, and p, pu ≥ 0, a consumer with valuation
v make a purchase of a used game in current period if and only if his current
period utility from doing so exceeds his utility from purchasing a new game in
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current and all future periods, purchasing a used copy in any future periods,
or not purchasing at all,
4. for any period and for any x ∈ X, and p, pu ≥ 0,the aggregate used copy
supply which is result in consumers’ optimal used copy selling decisions, equals
to qs∗u (x),
5. both firm and consumers form rational expectations about future prices,
6. the used goods market clears every period or the used price is zero; that is,
pu(x) > 0 only if qs∗u (x) = qd∗u (x), and pu(x) = 0 otherwise.
3.4 Numerical Details in Solving for Equilibrium
In this section, I describe the details of solving for the equilibrium numeri-
cally. I discuss the approximation of value functions, which is an essential part of
solving dynamic programming with continuous state variables. Then I describe the
value iteration procedure.
3.4.1 Approximation
I need to approximate for four values: Epu(x), EW2(x), Ep(x) are used in
the calculation of used game price, and EΠ(x) is needed for the calculation of sum
of discounted profit to solve the dynamic problem. The challenge in doing so is
that in my model, the state space cannot be represented by a regular grid, which
renders many popular approximation methods in marketing and economics, such as
Chebyshev polynomial and spline approximation, inapplicable. This is because the
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state variable s, which represents the cumulative sales so far, governs the maximum
value the other state variable, v, can take. That is, if a firm has sold s percent
of the total demand so far, by construction one cannot have remaining demand
higher than 1− s, and thus the maximum value of v is F−1(1− s). One can try to
convert the state space into a rectangular grid. For example, one can transform v to
F (v)/(1 − s). I found, however, that this type of conversions introduces additional
numerical error, especially when 1 − s is small, and yields numerically unstable
approximated value functions. The bi-linear approximation, which can be used with
non-rectangular grid, does not work either because the firm’s control in my model is
continuous. The bi-linear approximation introduces too many kink points and the
optimization for continuous control breaks down. To solve this challenge, I employ
recently developed the radial basis function (RBF) approximationBuhmann (2000),
which can accommodate scattered data and also yields smooth approximated values.
I briefly introduce the RBF approximation methods here, and I refer to Buhmann
(2003) and Fasshauer (2007) for further details.
Suppose I have scattered data centers X = {x1, . . . ,xN} ⊂ Rk and associated
real function values f(xi), i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. O look for a continuous function fˆ : Rk →
R which satisfies the interpolation condition,
fˆ(xi) = f(xi), i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. (3.4.1)
In the RBF approximation, one assumes that fˆ(xi) is of the form
fˆ(x) =
N∑
i=1
wiφ(||x− xi||)
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where φ(·) is the radial basis function and wi ∈ {wi, · · · , wN} are the coefficients of
the approximation. The coefficientsw = (wi, · · · , wN ) are found by the interpolation
condition 3.4.1,
w = A−1f
where Aij = φ(||xi − xj ||) and f = (f(x1), . . . , f(xN )). I use the multiquadratic
radial basis function,
φ(r) =
√
1 + (εr)2
where ε is the shape parameter, which I set to 1.5 to preserve the monotonicity of fˆ .
There are a couple of additional advantages of this method. First, it helps solving
the curse of dimensionality. Since one does not have to represent the state space
by a tensor product between grids of state variables, as the dimensionality of the
state increases, the number of function evaluations needed can be smaller than Nk,
where N is the number of grid points and k is the dimensionality of the state. Also,
one can add additional centers on the region in the state space where it matters for
better accuracy. That is, in my model, while the neighborhood near starting point
of s = 0, v = 1 is important in firm’s profit, the profit implication of the region with
large value of s is very small. Hence, I use more centers around s = 0, v = 1 so I can
get better accuracy around that point.
3.4.2 Value Function Iteration
I calculate the solution of the dynamic problem through value iteration
(?Bertsekas, 1995), and I briefly describe its steps. The detailed steps of numer-
ical algorithm is in the Appendix 2. Firstly I choose n approximation centers in
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the state space. For each iteration, I loop over each center, and optimize the firm’s
profit with respect to v¯. To calculate the sum of discounted profit, for any candidate
v ∈ [0, v], I obtain next state s′ = s + q and v′ = F−1 (F (v)− λs). The latter is
from the market clearing condition. Then I calculate pu(v, v′,x) following (3.2.3),
and in turn p(v¯, pu,x) following (3.2.4). After each iteration, I calculate and store
the coefficients for the approximation for the next iteration. I repeat these steps
until the values converge.
The loop-intensive nature of the procedure makes implementation with high-
level languages virtually infeasible, because it will be inadequately slow. Hence, the
algorithm was programmed in Python, but the loop-intensive and the approximation
part are coded in C. Specifically, I use Cython3, which generates efficient C code from
the Cython language which is close to the Python language. The calculation at one
approximation center is independent from those at other centers, and I parallelized
the code using openMP.4
3.5 Simulated Prices and Sales in Market Equilibrium
I numerically solve for the equilibrium with specific parameters and a series
of draws of aggregate error to illustrate equilibrium outcomes my model generates.
Comparing to the actual data I will show in the next chapter, my model can generate
realistic price trajectories. I use a truncated normal distribution with parameters
µ = 0.5 and σ = 1, and support [0, 1] for F (v). I set α = 2, δ = 0.95 and use
3http://cython.org
4http://openmp.org
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two values of λ, 0.01 and 0.005 and compared the equilibrium paths. Figure 3.1
shows the equilibrium trajectories of the two simulations. The plots on the left side
show the equilibrium trajectories of v, p and pu. The plots on the right represent
the shape of the demand distribution, and each number and colored area under the
density curve represent the specific period and its new sales volume, respectively.
Periods with higher sales volume have darker color, and one can easily see how much
penetration the firm has for each period.
In both cases the price trajectories show typical intertemporal price discrim-
ination behavior of the monopolist. Larger λ (higher probability of losing interest in
the game) has two effects on consumers’ dynamic purchasing decision. Firstly, since
they expect to lose interest in game earlier, consumers have lower expected utility
from purchasing the game. In addition, larger λ also means there will be more sup-
ply of used copy later and lower used goods price, and thus it makes waiting option
relatively more attractive. Since the early sales will become used goods supply in
the later periods, the firm chooses to sell less in and λ = 0.01 case. As a result, the
firm gets significantly lower profit in larger λ case (Π = 1.430 when λ = 0.01 and
Π = 1.651 with λ = 0.005).
In sum, similar to the two-period model, since selling new copies of the game
has additional negative effect on the profit through becoming used copy supply in
the future, the firm chooses to sell relatively smaller quantity of the game initially to
mitigate this. With larger λ, even though the firm optimally response to the higher
competition from the used good market, the profit of the firm suffers.
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Figure 3.1: Equilibrium path
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Chapter 4
Data Analysis
4.1 Data
The main dataset of this study is the price data collected from Amazon.com.
I have collected daily data for all games sold in Amazon between Feb 27, 2010 and
April 2, 2012. For each game, I use the price of the new game officially sold from
Amazon.com as the new price, and the minimum price1 of the used game listings
posted by individual sellers through the Amazon marketplace as the used price.
Since my estimation strategy relies on solving for the unobserved aggregate
shock from the initial period, I can only use video games which I observe the data
from their release period. Since many games appear in Amazon’s listings before their
release, I have collected release date information from the Wikipedia2, and only use
the games released after Feb 27, 2010. For estimation, I have aggregated the daily
data and generated weekly price trajectories.
The plots in figure 4.1 show the trajectories of new and used prices for several
example games included in the data. There are some regularities in the data. Firstly,
all console games are priced at $59.99 at their release. Also, for all games, the price
1This is the used from price.
22010 in video gaming (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2010_in_video_gaming) and 2011 in
video gaming (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_in_video_gaming)
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trajectories eventually converge to a stable, absorbing state, where basically the
trajectories become flat. And the shape of the price trajectories and the time it
takes for them to converge to the absorbing state differ across games. For example,
for Dead Rising 2, the prices more or less decline linearly, and it takes more than a
year for the new game price to hit 20 dollars. On the other hand, for EA SPORTS
MMA, there are significant price decrease soon after its release, and it only takes
about 4 months to hit 20 dollars. Since firms set their prices strategically, the shape
of price decline has information about the underlying demand.
One issue of using Amazon.com’s data is that whether its prices are represen-
tative prices that consumers face when they make purchase decisions. If Amazon.com
sets the price independently from the producers, I cannot regard its prices as the
results from monopolists’ intertemporal price discrimination. I use this data for two
reasons; first, the observed price trajectories consistently show the patterns of price
skimming. Second, since consumers have little cost of web surfing and price compar-
ison online, it is not unlikely that Amazon.com’s prices are systematically different
from those of other online retailers’.
4.1.1 Initial Prices
My model starts in the initial period, where the previous sales are zero and
thus there is full demand remaining, and no used goods supply. However, I observe
both new and used prices in the data from the release date. The potential reasons
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Figure 4.1: Weekly Price Trajectories
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for this include weekly aggregation, the measurement error3, and ineffective listings4.
Hence I discard the first observation of the used game price. Since initial prices of
all games are set at $59.99, I cannot infer the aggregate error from this price. Hence,
I assume that the draw of error is 1 at that period, and regard future errors as the
relative errors to that of the initial period. Given the state of s = 0, v = 1 and the
ξ0 = 1, I calculate the inferred control by find v0 which would yield the price level
of $59.99. Depending on the demand parameters, there are cases where even v0 = 1
cannot generate p0 = 59.99. In those cases I fixed v0 = 1 and assumed that there
were no sales in the period.
4.1.2 Total Sales
To convert the results from the counterfactual analysis in Chapter 4.4 to
actual dollar terms, I need total number of sales figures for each game i, denoted by
Mi. Since my model yields implied the sales volume for each period as a percentage
of total demand, I can multiply the shares by Mi and get the implied sales volume
for each period. I gather the total sales information from one of the online video
game information provider. This provider only produces yearly sales figures, and I
used up to two years of sales after release as the proxy for the total game sales, since
after two years of release, typically new game sales are negligible.
3Although I have collected daily data, since I have only gathered the data once per day, I do
not observe the actual data at the moment of game release.
4Some sellers often have used copy listings with very high prices, without any hope of selling it
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4.2 Estimation
I introduce parametric assumptions for demand distribution for estimation.
For F (v), the c.d.f. of the demand distribution, I use truncated normal distribution
with support [0, 1]. As well as the minimum and maximum value, it is characterized
by its location (µ) and scale (σ) parameters, which are a part of the structural
parameters I estimate.
All parameters except δ are video game specific: µ and σ, the parameters
characterizing demand distribution, λ, the durability parameter, α, the newness
parameter, and β, the price sensitivity. I do not attempt to estimate the discount
factor, since it is not well identified in dynamic setting (Magnac and Thesmar, 2002).
The inverse of interest rate is the usual value used for weekly discount factor in
literature. However, recently Yao, Mela, Chiang, and Chen (2012) found consumers’
estimated weekly discount factor to be much lower through a field study, and thus
I chose to set δ = 0.95 at the level of week. Even though consumers might have
lower discount factor than the interest rate, it is unreasonable to assume that the
firm would also has lower discount factor. Hence, I use 0.99 for the firm’s discount
factor, δf . Hence I am estimating 5 parameters, where I denote the game i specific
structural parameters by θi = (µi, σi, λi, αi, βi), where I drop i whenever it is not
ambiguous.
Unfortunately, likelihood based estimation approach is not feasible because
the Jacobian for the change of variables is not available analytically due to complex
and nonlinear relationship between the demand shock, ξ, and observed prices. Hence
I employ the estimation strategy based on Hansen and Singleton (1982)’s generalized
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instrumental variables estimation of nonlinear rational expectations models. My
estimation strategy is analogous to Petrin (2002) and Gowrisankaran and Rysman
(2012), which supplemented approach taken by Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995)
(henceforth BLP) with additional moments from the model.
Specifically, I firstly invert the observed price systems to solve for the aggre-
gate error, ξt and predicted prices. Then I construct three sets of moments: 1) the
first moment of ξt, 2) the orthogonality conditions using instruments, and 3) supply
moments which match the predicted prices to the observed prices.
4.2.1 Inversion of the Equilibrium Pricing Conditions
Analogous to BLP, I invert the price system via contraction mapping to solve
for the aggregate demand shock, ξt, and the predicted prices. The intuition for the
procedure is the following: given the state, since ξt are serially uncorrelated5, the
expected future values only depend on the firm’s control through its impact on the
next state variables. Then given the state and the future expected values, I can find
the ξt which rationalize the differences between observed new and used prices from
the equilibrium condition.
Specifically, given the states and observed prices, I aim to find ξ∗ which satis-
fies the equilibrium condition for the new copy marginal consumer, ξt = β
(pt − put)
(α− 1) · v¯t .
Let pt, put be the actual prices from the data, and v¯∗t (ξt, st, vt) be the profit max-
imizing quantity that firm chooses given ξt and the state st and vt. Let ξti denote
5In principle I could allow ξt to be serially correlated, but in that case I will be introducing ξt
as an additional state variable and it will increase computational burden significantly. This is a
limitation of my model.
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the ξt value at the i’th iteration of the contraction. I take the following steps:
Step 1 Start with ξt0 = 1 and the tolerance .
Step 2 Given ξti−1 and the state, compute v¯∗ti−1(ξti−1, st, vt), the profit maximizing
quantity by solving firm’s problem described in (3.2.5)
Step 3 Update ξti = β
(pt − put)
(α− 1) · v¯∗ti−1(ξti−1, st, vt)
Step 4 If |ξti − ξti−1| < , stop. Otherwise, go to Step 2
Since I solve the firm’s optimization problem in this procedure, it also simultaneously
yields the implied prices, pˆt, pˆut, which satisfy pt − put = pˆt − pˆut, and the implied
next states.
Now the question is how to infer st and vt when I do not observe the sales.
The key observation here is that the knowledge of current state is sufficient in calcu-
lating current error, and I do know the state for a game at its release period, which
is s0 = 0, v0 = 1. Hence, I can calculate ξ0, and I get the implied state for period
1 from the procedure. Then I move to the next period, and calculate ξ1 given the
implied state. I repeat this with the successive periods. Since I cannot infer the state
without sales data unless I observe the prices from the beginning, this does restrict
me to use only games which I observe data from their release period.
I have not been able to provide a formal proof that the procedure described
above will yield unique estimate of ξt. At least in many experiments with simulated
data with realized errors, I found that the inversion procedure reliably recovers ξt.
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Since I assume that E[ξt] = 1, recovered ξt’s give me the first moment con-
dition I can use in estimation.
4.2.2 Instruments
Since Bresnahan (1981), allowing the price to be correlated with the aggre-
gate error has been standard in the studies of industries with differentiated products.
In fact, prices are explicit function of the demand shock in my model, and thus I use
instruments (Z) and the orthogonality conditions in my estimation:
E[Z′ξ(θ)] = 0.
Since I assume that the aggregate shock is serially uncorrelated, the lagged
prices are valid instruments. Also, in case of games which were released in mul-
tiple platforms, I use the lagged prices of the same game from other platforms as
well. While the demand for the game likely differs across platforms since consumers’
choices of game console are not random, it is likely that the demand shocks are
correlated across consoles for the same game, and thus the prices will be correlated.
Potentially I can also include prices of other games in the same genre as well, because
it is reasonable to assume that the aggregate shocks are correlated across games in
the same genre.
4.2.3 Moments from Supply Side
The last set of moments I use are moments from the supply side equilibrium.
Specifically, the procedure described in (4.2.1) yields predicted new and used prices
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associated with the error simultaneously, and I match the predicted prices to the
observed prices for each period:
E[|pt − pˆt|] = 0,
E[|put − pˆut|] = 0.
I do find that the inclusion of these additional conditions improve the fit signifi-
cantly. This is analogous to the micro moments Petrin (2002) and Gowrisankaran
and Rysman (2012)6 used, in a sense that I match moment predicted from the model
to the moment from the data.
4.2.4 Objective function
The three sets of moments that the GMM objective function includes are
G1(θ), the first moment of ξt, G2(θ) the orthogonality conditions, and G3(θ), the
moments from the supply side. I assume that the population moment conditions
uniquely equal zero at true θ0:
E [G(θ0)] = E
 G1(θ0)G2(θ0)
G3(θ0)
 = 0.
Following Hansen and Singleton (1982), my estimates of the parameters, θˆ
6They used the difference between observed and predicted increase in household penetration
between two time periods to improve the identification.
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are the solution of the following:
θˆ = arg min
Σ
{
G(θ)′WG(θ)
}
where W is the weighting matrix.
4.2.5 Laplace-Type Estimator (LTE)
Since my GMM objective function is a complex nonlinear function of pa-
rameters, my GMM objective function yields many local minima which complicate
the optimization and can lead wrong policy implications (Knittel and Metaxoglou,
2012). Hence, I employ the Laplace-Type Estimator (LTE), developed by Cher-
nozhukov and Hong (2003). The LTE can be especially useful in my application
because it is robust to local minima through utilizing Markov chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) methods after transforming the objective function to the quasi-posterior
distribution. For details of the LTE procedure, see Appendix 3.
4.2.6 Identification
Heuristically, the general difference between new and used prices over time
will identify α. The general level of prices will identify β; for example, with β fixed
at 1, simulations cannot generate price levels which are realistic (for example, above
$50) regardless of other parameters. The shape of price trajectories of individual
games will identify µ and σ, the demand parameters. The rate of price decrease
in different periods has information about underlying demand distribution; it will
rapidly decrease around the region where the slope of the density of the demand is
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high, and it will decrease slowly around the region where the slope is more flat. The
general rate of price decline, specifically the number of periods it takes for the prices
to go to the absorbing state, will identify θ, the probability of losing interest in the
game.
Note that the µ and σ might not be well-identified when σ is large. This is
because as the scale parameter gets larger, the demand distribution increasingly re-
sembles the uniform regardless of the value of µ. In this case, however, the estimates
of the µ and σ do not matter anyway in the counterfactual analysis.
4.2.7 Estimation Using Simulated Data
Before I estimate the demand parameters with real data, I firstly estimate my
model with simulated data for a set of parameter values and a series of realizations
of the aggregate error, ξt. Given parameters and i.i.d. draws of the aggregate shocks,
I simulate the equilibrium path. Taking the resulting prices as the data, I run the
estimation. I use i.i.d. draws from truncated normal distribution with mean and
scale parameters equal to (1, 0.4) as the aggregate demand shocks. Table 4.1 shows
the results from the estimation. In general, the parameters are precisely estimated,
except the posterior for λ has slightly larger variance.7 Importantly, my model
manages to successfully recover the true parameters; for all parameters, the true
value lies within the range of standard deviation of the estimates.
7I suspect that this is due to suboptimal weighting matrix (identity) in the GMM objective
function that I use to generate the results. Improved implementation should yield more efficient
estimates.
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Table 4.1: Simulation Estimates
Parameter
µ σ λ α β
Mean STD Mean STD Mean STD Mean STD Mean STD
True 0.700 0.250 0.005 3.500 0.070
Estimated 0.720 0.136 0.309 0.105 0.006 0.004 3.646 0.564 0.072 0.025
4.3 Estimation Results
I run the estimation with real data using LTE for multiple games and report
the results. Table 4.2 shows the parameter point estimates and standard deviations
of the posterior draws for each game titles.
The parameters are generally precisely estimated. λ is relatively less precise,
as with the simulation results. In general, the estimated demand distributions show
various shapes across games; the range of µ is from 0.236 of Duke Nukem Forever
to 0.826 of Red Faction Armageddon. σ also has significant variation, from 0.107
of Duke Nukem Forever to 0.677 of L.A. Noire, though in general the valuation
distributions have highly concentrated mass around the mean. The additional utility
consumers get from the new copy versus used copy, which is represented by α, vary
across games, suggesting new copies of certain games are more differentiated from
the used copies than others. A potential reason for this is that games with higher α
might have features only applicable to new purchase, such as bonus items which can
be redeemed only once. Price sensitivity (β) also varies across games, suggesting
that the demand for each game consists of different types of consumers in terms
of price sensitivity. For example, games with higher price sensitive demands such
as Castlevania: Lords of Shadow (0.116), Duke Nukem Forever (0.148), Marvel vs.
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Table 4.2: Estimation Results
Title µ σ λ α β
Mean STD Mean STD Mean STD Mean STD Mean STD
Alpha Protocol 0.702 0.198 0.414 0.236 0.011 0.008 4.114 0.510 0.046 0.016
Backbreaker Football 0.622 0.071 0.218 0.038 0.006 0.004 3.529 0.210 0.099 0.014
Brink 0.796 0.129 0.335 0.115 0.010 0.006 3.422 0.389 0.053 0.018
Bulletstorm 0.772 0.142 0.302 0.131 0.008 0.006 3.398 0.817 0.048 0.012
Castlevania: Lords of
Shadow 0.546 0.346 0.215 0.150 0.008 0.007 3.382 0.802 0.116 0.058
Dead Rising 2 0.714 0.234 0.431 0.262 0.016 0.013 3.115 0.722 0.046 0.023
Dragon Age 2 0.726 0.159 0.292 0.088 0.006 0.004 3.233 0.453 0.045 0.019
Duke Nukem Forever 0.236 0.236 0.107 0.061 0.018 0.013 2.872 0.579 0.148 0.032
EA SPORTS MMA 0.812 0.131 0.311 0.105 0.007 0.004 3.512 0.510 0.062 0.020
Fallout: New Vegas 0.749 0.153 0.262 0.096 0.007 0.004 3.073 0.481 0.053 0.015
L.A. Noire 0.481 0.262 0.677 0.058 0.003 0.001 4.238 0.403 0.033 0.007
Lost Planet 2 0.713 0.195 0.500 0.325 0.054 0.028 2.032 0.377 0.033 0.007
Marvel vs. Capcom 3: Fate
of Two Worlds 0.621 0.326 0.203 0.131 0.006 0.005 3.236 0.630 0.101 0.036
Medal of Honor 0.767 0.194 0.287 0.115 0.005 0.003 3.849 0.610 0.062 0.028
Mindjack 0.752 0.167 0.263 0.099 0.005 0.003 3.716 0.530 0.067 0.028
ModNation Racers 0.440 0.276 0.281 0.258 0.013 0.010 3.497 0.860 0.084 0.049
Need for Speed: Shift 2 -
Unleashed 0.743 0.195 0.507 0.235 0.020 0.012 3.080 0.639 0.046 0.018
Red Faction Armageddon 0.826 0.114 0.333 0.077 0.008 0.005 3.752 0.536 0.058 0.028
Singularity 0.693 0.240 0.235 0.201 0.021 0.015 3.107 0.816 0.091 0.060
Star Wars: The Force
Unleashed II 0.611 0.365 0.250 0.144 0.007 0.009 3.839 0.891 0.107 0.032
Test Drive Unlimited 2 0.754 0.158 0.307 0.113 0.009 0.007 3.077 0.604 0.071 0.036
Transformers: War for
Cybertron 0.500 0.248 0.343 0.246 0.005 0.006 4.237 0.528 0.068 0.029
TRON: Evolution 0.752 0.173 0.353 0.154 0.016 0.013 3.260 0.885 0.058 0.034
UFC Undisputed 2010 0.695 0.229 0.210 0.116 0.008 0.006 3.426 0.699 0.088 0.029
Capcom 3: Fate of Two Worlds (0.101), and Star Wars: The Force Unleashed II
(0.107) are all action and fighting games which are more likely to attract younger
consumers, who are likely to be more price sensitive.
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4.4 Counterfactual Analysis: Elimination of the Used Goods Mar-
ket
One of the main questions of my study is that the profit implication of
the elimination of the used goods market. Since I explicitly include the supply
side in my estimation, modifying my model to accommodate this counterfactual
is straightforward. First, I remove the used goods related choices from consumers’
dynamic decisions. Without the opportunity to sell the used copy I have Z(p,x) = 0
and the Bellman equations becomes,
W (v,p,x) = ξv + δ(1− λ)E [W (v,p′,x′)|x] (4.4.1)
Vj(v,p,x) =
ξαv − βp+ δ {(1− λ)E [W (v,p′,x′)|x]} (j = 1),δE [V (v,p′,x′)|x] (j = 0). (4.4.2)
where j denotes buying new copy (j = 1) and waiting (j = 0), respectively. Note
that without the used goods market, p does not matter anymore after purchase and
W (·) becomes just the sum discounted future expected utilities:
W (v,p,x) = W (v,x) =
1
1− δ(1− λ) · v + (ξ − 1)v
New copy marginal consumer condition is (note that I have v′ = v)
ξαv′ − βp+ δ {(1− λ)E [W (v′,x′)|x]} = δE [ξ′αv′ − βp′ + δ(1− λ)W (v′,x′′)∣∣x]
(4.4.3)
Hence I have
α(ξ−δ)v′+δ(1−λ) 1
1− δ(1− λ) ·v
′−δ2(1−λ) 1
1− δ(1− λ) ·v
′ = βp−δβE [p(x′)∣∣x]
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βp =
{
α(ξ − δ) + δ(1− λ)(1− δ) 1
1− δ(1− λ)
}
· v′ + δβE [p(x′)∣∣x]
∴ p = 1
β
{
α(ξ − δ) + δ(1− λ)(1− δ) 1
1− δ(1− λ)
}
· v′ + δE [p(x′)∣∣x]
I follow procedure similar to Appendix 2 to calculate the equilibrium path under the
counterfactual scheme.
Since I infer the sales volume for each period as a percentage of the total
demand, to evaluate counterfactual profit changes in dollar terms, I need Mi, the
total number of sales for a game i. That is, the estimation and the policy simulation
yield implied sales share in percentage for each period, and I can calculate the implied
sales figures by multiplying each share by Mi. With sales and prices for each period,
producing implied profit is straightforward. I use total sales of two years since game
i’s release to approximate Mi8.
Table 4.3 shows the results from the counterfactual analysis, with games
ordered by the percentage change in profit. Note that I keep the fixed initial price of
$59.99 for the counterfactual scheme. The effect of eliminating the used goods market
are generally positive for the firm, but Duke Nukem Forever shows negative profit
changes after the change. On average, the profit increase is about 38%, which is about
4 million dollars. The effects widely differ across games, however. In general, the less
popular a game is, in a sense that the game has higher proportion of low valuation
consumers, the less the game gets benefited by the structural change. For example,
games with lower value of µ such as Duke Nukem Forever (µ = 0.236, -0.71%), L.A.
8In general after two years since release, games have negligent sales figures
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Table 4.3: Profit Changes After Eliminating the Used Goods Market
Title Resale No Resale Change (%) Total Sales Change ($)† Genre
Fallout: New Vegas 25.160 42.355 68.34 1,627,206 $27,978 Role-Playing
UFC Undisputed 2010 15.624 25.411 62.64 628,112 $6,147 Fighting
Red Faction Armageddon 26.182 42.390 61.91 104,352 $1,691 Shooter
Bulletstorm 28.692 46.052 60.50 145,355 $2,523 Shooter
EA SPORTS MMA 27.614 43.634 58.01 143,272 $2,295 Fighting
Medal of Honor 28.631 45.198 57.86 1,263,687 $20,935 Shooter
Mindjack 27.497 43.096 56.73 43,239 $674 Shooter
Brink 28.263 44.209 56.42 489,385 $7,803 Shooter
Test Drive Unlimited 2 22.406 34.589 54.37 120,711 $1,470 Racing
Dragon Age 2 28.661 43.500 51.77 569,159 $8,445 Role-Playing
Singularity 13.481 19.891 47.55 173,231 $1,110 Shooter
Lost Planet 2 3.908 5.733 46.69 290,938 $530 Shooter
TRON: Evolution 24.497 34.832 42.19 152,878 $1,580 Action
Marvel vs. Capcom 3: Fate
of Two Worlds
14.443 19.424 34.49 655,069 $3,263 Fighting
Backbreaker Football 14.754 19.408 31.54 119,115 $554 Sports
Dead Rising 2 27.896 35.615 27.67 522,010 $4,029 Action
Castlevania: Lords of
Shadow
16.146 20.445 26.63 285,359 $1,226 Action
Need for Speed: Shift 2 -
Unleashed
25.270 31.630 25.17 119,927 $762 Racing
Star Wars: The Force
Unleashed II
15.812 19.368 22.49 530,487 $1,886 Action
Alpha Protocol 35.586 42.760 20.16 152,596 $1,094 Role-Playing
ModNation Racers 22.899 26.451 15.51 367,544 $1,305 Racing
Transformers: War for
Cybertron
28.070 29.041 3.46 186,963 $181 Action
L.A. Noire 30.172 30.606 1.44 1,214,088 $527 Role-Playing
Duke Nukem Forever 22.432 22.271 -0.72 267,026 ($43) Shooter
Average 23.087 31.996 38.87 423,821 $4,082
†: Figures in thousands
Noire (µ = 0.481, 1.43%), and Transformers: War for Cybertron (µ = 0.500, 3.46%)
get small or negative profit increase. This is because the benefits from the structural
change mostly come from the increase in initial sales where the prices are still high;
without the opportunity of buying from the used goods market, more high valuation
consumers buy in the earlier period, because their future expected prices are higher
in the absence of the used goods market. However, the initial sales does not increase
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much for a game which does not have many high valuation consumers in its demand
to start with. In addition, since W (·) consists of the utility from the sum discounted
flow utility and the used goods sales opportunity, for given v and λ, the absence of the
resale option decreases the value of buying. Moreover, for consumers with lower v,
the utility from this option has relatively bigger share inW (·). Hence, their expected
utility from buying suffers more from the absence of the option and their willingness
to pay decreases more. Thus a game with higher mass of lower valuation consumers
would have smaller profit increase after the structural change, and for some cases
the profit change can be negative. This suggests uniformly removing the used goods
market can be a suboptimal policy; the optimal strategy for games with demand
consisting of large proportion of high valuation consumers is to eliminate the resale
market completely (e.g., by granting ownership exclusively through downloading),
whereas it can be more profitable to allow resale for games with high concentration
of lower valuation consumers.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
This dissertation investigates the impact of the used game market on equi-
librium market outcomes and the implications of eliminating it in the video game
industry. I develop a new model which incorporates inter-temporal price discrimi-
nation by producers, a used goods market, rational expectations by both consumers
and game producers, and market equilibria for both new and used games. To solve
the computational challenge comes with modeling the supply side equilibrium, I
develop a computationally tractable utility specification, which also allows me to
accommodate continuous consumer heterogeneity and non-linear price expectations.
Given the lack of sales data, I use the conditions from the supply side equilibrium
to identify the underlying demand distribution without sales information.
Using this model, I estimate the game-specific demand for multiple video
games released in the U.S. market. The results show significant variation in demand
across games, especially for the shape of the demand distribution. I run a counter-
factual analysis where I evaluate the profit change for each video game as a result of
eliminating the resale market. The counterfactual results suggest that eliminating
the used goods market yields significant profit increase for producers, but the size of
the effects varies significantly across games, depending on the shape of the demand
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distribution. In fact, allowing resales can even increase profits for small number of
games, suggesting differentiated optimal strategies regarding the used goods market.
It has implications for platform producers such as Microsoft, as instead of employing
a uniform policy to restrict the used goods market, it would be better to allow each
individual producers to decide their own policies.
As a future extension, my model can be extended to incorporate additional
information such as new game sales data. With the new information, I can accom-
modate additional aggregate shocks and make the model more flexible in fitting the
data. Another potential extension could be allowing the hazard of losing interest
in a game to be a function of time, λ (τ), instead of assuming λ to be a constant
as discussed in Chapter 3. Another extension would be making the utility from
purchasing a new game, α, time-varying.
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Appendices
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Appendix 1
Derivation of the Used Game Price Equation3.2.3
Given the proposition 1 and 2, consumer’s decision after purchase is quite
simple; they will hold the game and gets flow utility of v until they lose interest, and
they sell at pu:
W (v,x) = ξv + δE
[
(1− λ)W (v,x′) + λβpu(x′)
∣∣x] (1.0.1)
Then the indifference consumer condition is:
ξv′ − βpu(x) + δE
[
(1− λ)W (v′,x′) + λβpu(x′)|x
]
=
δE
[
ξ′αv′ − βp(x′) + δ {(1− λ)W (v′,x′′) + λβpu(x′′)}∣∣x]
⇒ −βpu(x) + ξv′ + δE
[
(1− λ)W (v′,x′) + λβpu(x′)|x
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=W (v′,x)
= δE
(α− 1)ξ′v′ − βp(x′) + ξ′v + δ {(1− λ)W (v′,x′′) + λβpu(x′′)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
=W (v′,x′)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣x

⇒ βpu(x)−W (v′,x) = −δE
[
(α− 1)ξ′v′ +W (v′,x′)− βp(x′)∣∣x]
⇒ pu(x) = β−1 ·
{−δ(α− 1)v′ +W (v′,x)− δE [W (v′,x′)∣∣x]}+ δE [p(x′)∣∣x]
(1.0.2)
64
Note that in case of s = 0, (at the release) the new copy buying decision
becomes automatically dynamic because v′ = F−1(F (v¯)− λs) = v¯.
For any period, the probability of losing interest in the game is λ and con-
sumers’ expected utility from any given period is E [(1− λ)v + λβpu(x′)|x]. Also,
when they lose interest in the game their future values are simply zero. Hence the
value becomes:
W (v,x) = ξv + δE
[
(1− λ)
ξ′v + δ ·
(1− λ){ξ′′v + · · ·}+ λβpu(x′′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
lose interest in 2+


+ λβpu(x
′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
lose interest in 1+
∣∣∣∣∣x
]
(1.0.3)
where x′ and x′′ denote the 1 and 2 periods future’s state, respectively. I can group
terms into one with v and the other with pu:
W (v,x) = ξv + δ(1− λ) [v + δ(1− λ) {v + · · · }] (1.0.4)
+δE
[
λβpu(x
′) + δ · {(1− λ)λβpu(x′′) + · · ·}∣∣x]
Hence I have,
W (v,x) =
1
1− δ(1− λ) ·v+(ξ−1)v+δλE
[
βpu(x
′) + δ · {(1− λ)βpu(x′′) + · · ·}∣∣x]
(1.0.5)
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and
W (v,x) =
(
(ξ − 1) + 1
1− δ(1− λ)
)
· v
+ E
[
δλβpu(x1) + ·
∞∑
τ=1
(δ · (1− λ))τ δλβpu(xτ+1)
∣∣∣∣∣x
]
(1.0.6)
Hence, I can convert this to a infinite geometric series with common ratio
δ(1− λ) and scale factor v and sum of discounted future used good prices:
W (v,x) =
(
(ξ − 1) + 1
1− δ(1− λ)
)
· v + E
[ ∞∑
τ=0
(δ(1− λ))τ δλβpu(xτ+1)
∣∣∣∣∣x
]
(1.0.7)
then I can separate W (v,x) into two part:
W (v,x) = W1(v) +W2(x)
where
W1(v) =
(
(ξ − 1) + 1
1− δ(1− λ)
)
· v,
W2(x) = E
[ ∞∑
τ=0
(δ(1− λ))τ δλβpu(xτ+1)
∣∣∣∣∣x
]
(1.0.8)
= E
[
δλβpu(x
′) + δ(1− λ)W2(x′)
∣∣x]
This form is intuitive in a sense that a consumer’s value from keeping the
game is weighted sum of the future discounted utility from holding the game and
future used good price, and the weight depends on the probability of losing interest
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in the game. Note that W2(x) is the same for everybody. Then the used copy price
equation becomes:
pu(x) = β
−1 {−δ(α− 1)v′ +W (v′,x)− δE [W (v′,x′)∣∣x]}+ δE [p(x′)∣∣x]
⇒ pu(x) = β−1
{−δ(α− 1)v′ +W1(v′) +W2(x)− δE [W1(v′) +W2(x′)∣∣x]}
+ δE
[
p(x′)
∣∣x]
⇒ pu(x) = β−1
{
(ξ − 1) + 1− δ
1− δ(1− λ) − δ(α− 1)
}
v′
+ β−1
{
W2(x)− δE
[
W2(x
′)
∣∣x]}+ δE [p(x′)∣∣x]
I can simplify W2(x)− δE [W2(x′)|x] more:
W2(x)− δE
[
W2(x
′)
∣∣x] = E [δλβpu(x′) + δ(1− λ)W2(x′)∣∣x]− δE [W2(x′)∣∣x]
= E
[
δλβpu(x
′)− δλW2(x′)
∣∣x]
∴ pu(x) = β−1
{(
(ξ − 1) + 1− δ
1− δ(1− λ) − δ(α− 1)
)
v′ − δλE [W2(x′)∣∣x]}
+δE
[
p(x′)
∣∣x]+ δλE [pu(x′)∣∣x] (1.0.9)
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Appendix 2
Steps for the Solution of the Rational Expectations
Equilibrium
In order to solve this dynamic programming problem, I need to solve for
Π(x), the firm’s value, p(x), the price policy function for the firm, pu(x), the market
clearing price, and W2(x), the portion of future used goods selling option among
the consumers’ value from holding the game. The following steps describe the value
iteration procedure.
Start with Ep0(x) = 0, Ep0u(x) = 0, EW 02 (x) = 0, and EΠ0(x) = 0. Loop
over i, i ∈ N, until Epi(x), Epiu(x), EW i2(x), EΠi(x) all converge (where i is the
number of iteration). In each iteration,
1. Loop over each grid point x = (s, v) ∈ X. For each x, calculate the maximized
profit, Πi(x) = maxv pi(v,x) · q + δE
[
Πi−1(x′)
∣∣x]. Specifically, for any given
state x, ξ and control v, I can calculate the implied profit as follows:
(a) (given v) update state variables: x′ = (s′, v′) with the following state
transition rules:
s′ = s+ q, where q = F (v)− F (v)
v′ = max
{
0, F−1 (F (v)− λ · s)}
68
(b) Interpolate for Epi−1u (x′), EW
i−1
2 (x
′), Epi−1(x′), and EΠi−1(x′).
(c) calculate used copy prices,
piu(x, ξ) = β
−1
(
(ξ − 1) + 1− δ
1− δ(1− λ) − δ(α− 1)
)
v′
−β−1δλE [W i−12 (x′)|x]
+δE
[
pi−1(x′)|x]+ δλE [pi−1u (x′)|x]
(d) calculate new copy price and profit:
pi(x, ξ) = β−1ξ · (α− 1) · v + piu(x)
Πi(x, ξ) = pi(x, ξ) · q + δE [Πi−1(x′)∣∣x]
(e) when maximization is done, update consumers’ value,
W i2(x) = E
[
δλpi−1u (x′) + δ(1− λ)W i−12 (x′)
∣∣x]
2. Calculate interpolation coefficients for E
[
pi(x)
]
, E
[
piu(x)
]
, E
[
W i2(x)
]
, and
E
[
Πi(x)
]
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Appendix 3
Details of the Laplace-Type Estimator
Let Ln(θ) denote the GMM objective function,
Ln(θ) = −n1
2
gn(θ)
′Wgn(θ)
where gn(θ) =
1
n
∑n
i=1mi(θ) and mi(θ) is the value of moments for observation
i. Following Chernozhukov and Hong (2003), I transform it to the quasi-posterior
distribution pn(θ),
pn(θ) =
exp(Ln(θ))pi(θ)´
λ exp(Ln(θ))pi(θ)dθ
which is proportional to
pn(θ) ∝ exp(Ln(θ))pi(θ)
Then I employ the following Metropolis-Hastings algorithm with the quasi-posterior:
Step 1 Choose a starting value θ0
Step 2 Generate the candidate θ′ from q(θ′|θj)
Step 3 Update θj+1 from θj for j = 1, 2, . . . , using
θj+1 =
θ′ with probability ρ(θj , θ′),θj with probability 1− ρ(θj , θ′),
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where
ρ(x, y) = inf
(
exp(Ln(y))pi(y)q(x|y)
exp(Ln(x))pi(x)q(y|x) , 1
)
I use the standard normal distribution for q(x|y) and the uniform prior for pi(θ). I
dynamically choose the tune parameters so the acceptance rate of chain is on average
0.3. I make 20,000 draws with the MCMC chain, and discard first 5,000 draws for
burn-in.
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